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Abstract 
 
his paper asks how Kant’s mature theory of freedom 
handles an objection pertaining to chance. This question 
is significant given that Kant raises this criticism against 
libertarianism in his early writings on freedom before coming to 
adopt a libertarian view of freedom in the Critical period. After 
motivating the problem of how Kant can hold that the free 
actions of human beings lack determining grounds while at the 
same maintain that these are not the result of ‘blind chance,’ I 
argue that Kant’s Critical doctrine of transcendental idealism, 
while creating the ‘conceptual space’ for libertarian freedom, is 
not intended to provide an answer to the problem of chance 
with respect to our free agency. I go on to show how the 
resources for a refutation of chance only come about in the 
practical philosophy. In the 2nd Critique, Kant famously argues 
for the reality of freedom on the basis of our consciousness of 
the moral law as the law of a free will. However, Kant also 
comes to build into his account of the will a genuine power of 
choice, which involves the capacity to deviate from the moral 
law. I conclude by showing that this apparent tension can be 
resolved by turning to his argument for the impossibility of a 
diabolical will. This involves a consideration of the distinct kind 
of grounding relationship that practical laws have to the human 
will, as well as the way that transcendental idealism makes this 
possible. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 recent interpretation of Kant’s Critical theory of free-
dom holds that, having aligned himself with Leibniz-
ian compatibilism in the pre-critical period, Kant 
comes to adopt a libertarian metaphysics of human agency.1 
This is significant because it would mean that Kant’s mature 
view ends up being extremely close to the position of his 
contemporary Christian August Crusius (1715-1775), the 
leading critic of the Leibnizian-Wolffian tradition of the time, 
and whose view Kant initially rejects. In the New Elucidation of 
the first principles of metaphysical cognition (1755), where we 
find the earliest of Kant’s discussions on freedom, Kant 
criticizes Crusius’s libertarian conception of freedom by claim-
ing that it leaves all human action up to chance; defining 
freedom in terms of an absence of determining grounds entails 
that chance is at play with respect to why we act one way rather 
than another. Call this the Chance objection.2  The central 
question of this paper is: how does Kant see his Critical theory 
of freedom in light of this objection? Irrespective of just how 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Hogan argues for this in several recent papers (2009a); (2009b); (2009c); (2010); (2013). 
Pereboom (2006) argues that Critical Kant holds to agent-causal libertarianism. Brewer and 
Watkins (2012) observe: “Kant’s acceptance of a libertarian notion of human freedom in the 
first and second Critiques is both controversial as a philosophical claim in its own right and 
somewhat surprising historically, given that early in his career, in the New Elucidation 
(1755), he had not only explicitly accepted, but even defended at length, a compatibilist 
notion of freedom. In his mature, Critical period, Kant’s primary focus is on transcendental 
freedom, and there his emphasis is not on the radical contingency entailed by libertarian 
freedom, but rather on the capacity to initiate a state ‘von selbst’ (spontaneously or on its 
own). At the same time, insofar as any violation of the moral law presupposes that one could 
have acted in accordance with it, Kant is also clearly committed to human freedom involving 
the capacity to do otherwise” (165fn3). 
2 There is a similar objection made by contemporary critics of libertarianism, who see the 
indeterminism required for freedom as taking too much control away from the agent, leaving 
the outcome of deliberation to luck. However, Kant never uses the word ‘luck’ in a 
metaphysical context. Rather, he follows the German rationalist tradition in speaking of 
“blind chance” (casus). For this reason, I use ‘chance’ exclusively in this paper, instead of 
‘luck.’ 
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close he moves to Crusius’s position, Kant remains concerned 
with evading the Chance objection into the Critical period. Still, 
we never get an explicit account from Kant on this point. Since 
many commentators take Kant to move considerably close to 
this kind of a view, if not adopting the position wholesale, it is 
striking that there has yet to be a proper investigation into what 
happens to his early criticism of libertarianism regarding 
chance. Indeed, it is likely that Kant has something to say about 
why his mature view of freedom is not susceptible to such a 
criticism. My aim here is to sketch out how the story is 
supposed to go. 
I begin by presenting the initial objection that Kant raises 
against Crusian libertarianism in the New Elucidation (§2), and 
show that Kant remains committed to distinguishing freedom 
from chance in the 1760s and 1770s, despite shifting to a 
libertarian conception of freedom sometime during this period 
(§3). I then argue that Kant’s Critical doctrine of trans-cendental 
idealism – while making ‘conceptual space’ for freedom – is 
not intended to provide an answer to the problem of chance 
with respect to our free agency (§4). I go on to show how the 
resources for a refutation of chance only come about in the 
practical philosophy. Kant famously argues for the reality of 
freedom on the basis of our consciousness of the moral law as 
the law of a free will. However, Kant also comes to build into 
his account of the will a genuine power of choice (Willkür), 
which allows for the capacity to deviate from the moral law. On 
its face, there is a tension between Kant’s commitment to both 
autonomy and the imputability of evil actions (§5). I conclude 
by showing that the tension can be resolved by appealing to his 
argument for the impossibility of a diabolical will (§6). This 
includes a consideration of the distinct kind of grounding 
relationship that practical laws have to the human will, as well 
as the way that transcendental idealism makes this possible. 
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2. Kant’s Compatibilism in the New Elucidation 
 
 begin by looking at Kant’s initial objection to libertarian-
ism in his pre-critical work, the New Elucidation of the first 
principles of metaphysical cognition (1755). In this text, 
Kant defends a compatibilist account of freedom in the tradition 
of Leibniz and Wolff. This is, in large part, a result of his shared 
commitment to the universal application of the principle of the 
determining ground, otherwise known as the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason (hereafter the PSR): that nothing is true 
without a reason, or determining ground.3 Much of the text is 
occupied by a debate about this principle, especially its relation 
to the issue of human freedom. 
In Proposition VIII, Kant upholds the PSR for all contingent 
things: “Nothing which exists contingently can be without a 
ground which determines its existence antecedently” (NE 
1:396). This is true, he thinks, even of free actions. In the 
Scholium to this proposition, Kant distinguishes his view from 
that of Crusius, who holds that at least some contingent things 
lack antecedent determining grounds – namely, the free acts of 
human beings: “He thinks that the free will is actually deter-
mined by its existence, not antecedently by grounds which are 
prior to its existence” (NE 1:397). Kant argues that any break in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Kant defines a ‘ground’ as: “That which determines a subject in respect of any of its 
predicates” (NE 1:391). Notably, Kant takes all grounds to be determining: “to determine is 
to posit in such a way that every opposite is excluded” (NE 1:393). This is in contrast to 
Crusius, who distinguishes between “determining” and “sufficient” grounds, the latter of 
which does not exclude its opposite. I follow Hogan in referring to the former as contrary-
excluding. One place that early Kant does agree with Crusius is in distinguishing between 
real and ideal grounds. He calls the former ‘antecedently’ determining grounds, and the latter, 
‘consequently’ determining grounds. Roughly, this amounts to a distinction between the 
reason why something is the case and the reason for knowing that something is the case. Of 
course, Crusius denies that there are antecedently determining grounds for free acts, while 
pre-Critical Kant affirms that even the voluntary actions of human beings have antecedently 
determining grounds. 	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the series of determining grounds leading up to an action 
inevitably makes it “the product of chance” (NE 1:402). He 
develops the Chance objection in a fictional dialogue between 
Titius (the Kantian spokesman) and Caius (the defender of 
Crusian libertarianism). Caius declares that freedom consists in 
the ability to do otherwise up until the moment of action: 
 
Personally, I should think that if you eliminate everything 
which is in the nature of a connected series of reciprocally 
determining grounds occurring in a fixed order, and if you 
admit that in any free action whatever a person finds 
himself in a state of indifference relative to both altern-
atives, and if that person, even though all the grounds 
which you have imagined as determining the will in a 
particular direction have been posited, is nonetheless able 
to choose one thing over another, no matter what – if all 
that is conceded, then I should finally admit that the act 
had been freely performed (NE 1:402). 
 
Kant’s view is that a conception of freedom such as this 
involves a lack of control that ends up taking away freedom 
rather than accounting for it. If there are no grounds determin-
ing my will one way rather than another, then there can be no 
reason for why I acted as I did. For, if the grounds do not 
determine, then I can never be certain what the outcome will be 
– no matter the strength of my inclinations in a particular 
direction. The possibility of doing otherwise is thus a central 
mark of the kind of libertarian freedom that Kant rejects in 
1755. 
Accordingly, Kant upholds a compatibilist account of 
freedom marked by a commitment to an unrestricted PSR for 
all contingent things. However, Kant still has to deal with an 
objection raised against anyone committed to the principle in 
this way. If there are determining grounds for my actions that 
stretch back before I was even born, then it would seem that I 
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could never be held responsible for what I do.4 Kant entertains 
this objection regarding fatalism from Crusius: “[...] he accuses 
us [...] of restoring to their ancient rights the immutable 
necessity of all things and the fate of the Stoics, and, further-
more, of impairing all freedom and morality” (NE 1:399). In 
what remains of the dialogue, Kant aims to demonstrate how 
one can adhere to the PSR while also maintain that human 
beings are free. 
To this end, he provides a positive conception of freedom in 
terms of spontaneity. Free action is “action which issues from 
an inner principle. When this spontaneity is determined in 
conformity with the representation of what is best it is called 
freedom” (NE 1:402). Shortly thereafter, a definition more 
explicitly connected to the PSR appears: “To act freely is to act 
in conformity with one’s desire, and to do so, indeed, with 
consciousness. And that is certainly not excluded by the law of 
the determining ground” (1:403). Since free acts are determined 
from grounds that lie within the subject – namely, a represent-
ation of what the agent takes to be best – what is at issue when 
considering the problem of human freedom is not whether 
determining grounds are present (as Crusius would have it), but 
rather the source of the grounds: are they internal or external? 
Says Kant: “What is at issue is the necessitating principle: 
namely, whence the thing is necessary” (NE 1:400). If grounds 
determine me from the outside, then the action is not free.5 This 
is Kant’s positive view. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Indeed, it was on the charge of determinism that Wolff was expelled from his university in 
Halle. The Prussian King was not particularly pleased by the implication that a soldier who 
flees from battle cannot be held responsible for his action. The presence of grounds for this 
action that stretch back before he was born entails that he could not have done otherwise than 
he did. 
5 Kant considers animal behavior to be of this sort: “necessitated in conformity with external 
stimuli and impulses...” (NE 1:400). For Kant, animals are pathologically necessitated, which 
is to say that they are not only affected but unable to resist being determined by external 
grounds. By contrast, human beings are only pathologically affected. Humans have the 
capacity to resist necessitation from external grounds, acting instead from grounds that lie 
within – i.e., motives of the understanding. 
                                  KSO 2015: 
 
Nicholas Dunn, 
‘A Lawful Freedom: Kant’s Practical Refutation of Noumenal Chance’ 
KSO 2015: 149-177. 
Posted September 30, 2015 www.kantstudiesonline.net 
© 2015 Nicholas Dunn & Kant Studies Online Ltd. 	  
155 
Before moving on, it should be noted that Crusius has 
something to say about why his libertarian account of freedom 
is able to refute an objection on the basis of chance. In the 
Sketch’s discussion of ontology, Crusius addresses the “main 
objection” raised against libertarian freedom: “that blind chance 
is introduced [into our free actions]” (§83).6 He handles this 
objection by distinguishing between “determining” grounds and 
“sufficient” grounds, and defines the latter as those that deter-
mine in a non-contrary-excluding way, such that the alternative 
is still possible. Moreover, Crusius takes free acts to be the kind 
of “fundamental activities” that “can occur or fail to occur 
under one and the same circumstances” (§83).7 It is central to 
his libertarian view of freedom that the agent has the ability to 
do otherwise, and this can only be true if there are grounds that 
can determine in a non-contrary-excluding way – i.e., ‘suffi-
cient’ grounds, in which “nothing is lacking that is necessary for 
causality,” although it is nonetheless possible that the act never 
takes place or that its opposite occurs (§84).8 
Kant, however, thinks that the only kinds of grounds are 
those that are contrary- excluding. He recognizes the distinction 
in usage between ‘sufficient’ and ‘determining’ grounds, and 
rejects the former on the basis that the word ‘sufficient’ is vague 
and unhelpful. More to the point: Kant thinks it would be a 
mistake to suggest that there can be circumstances where 
‘sufficient’ grounds – “requisite conditions” – are present and 
yet the activity fails to occur. There could never be an explan-
ation for why a particular effect follows from my will instead of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Christian August Crusius, Sketch of the Necessary Truths of Reason [Entwurf der 
notwendigen Vernunfwahrheiten,1745], in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: Background 
Source Materials, ed. and trans. Eric Watkins (New York: Cambridge UP, 2009), 159. 
7 Ibid., 158. cf. §449, 177. 
8 Ibid., 160. This is in contrast to activities that occur, or follow, necessarily whenever certain 
conditions are present: “[T]hey cannot fail to occur after the circumstances have been 
posited” (§82, p. 158). Dyck (forthcoming) discusses how, for Crusius, “fundamental free 
actions constitute the sole exception to the principle of determining ground as, for all other 
actions, it will be the case that the positing of a sufficient cause will imply that the action or 
effect could have been omitted or have occurred otherwise” (7). 
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another, given that its non-existence is possible. On Kant’s early 
view, then, human beings do not possess the ability to do 
otherwise, as there are determining grounds for everything they 
do. From this it follows that there is no threat of chance in 
human action. That is, Kant understands his own view as 
evading the Chance objection precisely because it denies that 
there are ever events in the world that lack antecedently deter-
mining grounds, including the free actions of human beings. 
 
3. Freedom as Absolute Contingency: A ‘Third Thing’ 
between Nature and Chance? 
 
ant remains concerned with avoiding chance in the 
1760s and 70s. This is clear from passages in his meta-
physics lecture notes, as well as various personal notes 
and reflections. Yet it is during this same period that Kant 
begins to shift to a view of freedom that shares many features of 
the libertarian position held by Crusius. By the mid-1760s, Kant 
holds that free acts lack antecedently determining grounds. 
Nonetheless, Kant continues to distinguish chance from free-
dom. It is unclear, at this point, whether Kant has any 
explanation as to how these can be distinguished, given that 
both are defined in terms of an absence of determining grounds. 
I think it is reasonable to read Kant as struggling to form his 
views during this period. 
Kant’s notion of chance in the New Elucidation, and into the 
Critical period, is in keeping with his German rationalist pre-
decessors – in particular, Alexander Baumgarten, whose 
Metaphysics (1757) textbook was used by Kant in his 
metaphysics lectures (cited here as LM) in the 1760s and 70s. 
We find the following definition of ‘chance’ (casus) in 
Baumgarten’s discussion of the concept of a world: “An event 
in a world whose sufficient ground is unknown is CHANCE. 
CHANCE whose sufficient ground does not exist would be 
PURE CHANCE, which is impossible and must not be posited 
K 
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in this or in any world” (sec. 383).9 Kant follows Baumgarten in 
defining ‘chance’ as an event whose grounds are either un-
known or lacking altogether, that is, where there is an absence 
of either real or ideal grounds. For example, in a passage from 
the Metaphysik Herder (1762-64), Kant writes: “Every ground 
determines its consequence necessarily: what is not necessary 
by a sufficient determinate ground is chance. == No existence 
of things, such as the free actions of Crusius, [that] are pure 
chances <casus puri>” (LM 28:41). In short, Kant continues to 
see the Crusian view as reducing freedom to chance. This is 
because he sees an absence of contrary-excluding grounds as 
allowing chance to enter into the production of the con-
sequence. 
However, as early as 1764, Kant begins to argue that 
freedom is incompatible with determining grounds: “[I]n 
human beings the chain of determining causes is in every case 
cut off [...]” (R 3855; NF 17:313-14). Free actions are identified 
with the “absolutely contingent” (R 3717; NF 17:260). Kant 
even stresses the point that even determination from inner 
grounds conflicts with freedom: “A substance that is not 
externally determined to produce something that previously did 
not exist acts freely, and this freedom is opposed to internal or 
external natural necessity” (R 3857; NF 17:316).10 This is in 
stark contrast to his 1755 account, according to which free acts 
are determined from grounds that lie within the acting subject. 
In a series of recent papers, Desmond Hogan argues con-
vincingly that Kant displays a “firm commitment” to libertarian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Alexander Baumgarten, Metaphysics: A Critical Translation with Kant’s Elucidations, 
Selected Notes, and Related Materials (1757), trans. and ed. with an Introduction by 
Courtney D. Fugate and John Hymers (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), 171. Although there 
is a distinction between ‘sufficient’ and ‘determining’ grounds in some of the German 
rationalists at the time (e.g., Crusius), I take it that here Baumgarten uses the term ‘sufficient’ 
roughly as Kant would use ‘determining.’ 
10 Kant will say something similar in the second Critique – namely, that appealing to inner 
rather than outer grounds in defense of freedom is a “wretched subterfuge” (KpV 5:96). 
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freedom by the mid- to late 1760s.11 Moreover, Hogan draws 
attention to Crusius’s influence on this shift.12 In particular, 
Kant follows Crusius in restricting the PSR to events 
(‘happenings’), while holding that free activity, from which a 
series of events is begun, is not antecedently determined. That 
is, Kant now seems to share Crusius’s view that free actions 
cannot be cognized a priori since they lack determining 
grounds.13 Rather, they can only be cognized a posteriori, 
through their effects or consequences. Kant elaborates on this 
point in an important reflection written around 1770-71: 
 
One can have no insight into the possibility of freedom, 
because one can have no insight into a first beginning, 
whether the necessity in existence in general or in freedom 
in the origination of events. For our understanding cog-
nizes existence through experience, but reason has insight 
into it if it cognizes it a priori, i.e, through grounds [...] 
Now there are no grounds for that which is first, thus no 
insight into it is possible through reason (R 4338; NF 
17:511). 
 
In short, it is quite clear that Kant now takes an unrestricted 
PSR for contingent created beings to be destructive of genuine 
freedom. What’s more, it is on fundamentally Crusian grounds 
that Kant argues for the absolute contingency of free actions. 
Nonetheless, various notes written in the 1770s show Kant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Desmond Hogan, “Noumenal Affection,” Philosophical Review 118 (2009): 517. See also 
Hogan 2009b; 2009c; 2013. Hogan also draws attention to Kant’s “tentative endorsement” of 
libertarianism as early as 1763, in his work on the proof of God’s existence. Here, Kant 
contrasts natural events, which occur necessarily, with free acts, the latter of which possess 
“an inadequately understood contingency” (OPA 2:110). Still, at this point, Kant holds to his 
1755 compatibilist view 
12 cf. Crusius, Sketch, §29, §63, §81, §385, §449. 
13 cf. Crusius, On the Use and Limits of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (1743) [De Usu et 
Limitibus Principii Rationis Determinantis vulgo Sufficientis], §43. This work has not been 
translated into English, but can be found in a collection of his texts in German: ed., G. Tonelli 
(Hildesheim: Olms Verlag, 1964).	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continuing to distinguish freedom from ‘blind chance,’ as well 
as from ‘blind fate.’14 Consider the following passages: 
 
Free actions happen in accordance with a rule just like 
natural ones. But they are not therefore determinable a 
priori like the latter; both are thus in conformity with 
reason, while blind fate and blind chance are [occult 
qualities] and are contrary to reason (R 4783; NF 17:726). 
 
Between nature and chance there is a third thing, namely 
freedom (R 5369; NF 18:163). 
 
Nature is opposed to: chance 
freedom 
fate (R 5607; NF 18:248) 
 
That Kant still sees freedom as distinct from chance is clear. In 
several places, Kant describes ‘blind chance’ as, in some way, 
contrary to reason, whereas freedom is “the explanatory ground 
of everything; [...] nothing but freedom can furnish a ground of 
origination [...]” (LM 28:199-200). What is not clear, though, is 
the basis for this distinction, given that both freedom and 
chance are characterized as lacking determining grounds. It is 
reasonable to read Kant as struggling, throughout this period, 
with his views about the nature of the relationship between 
human freedom and natural events. I don’t think that he has 
settled views here. Indeed, this problem resurfaces in the Third 
Antinomy of the first Critique. I consider this, and transcen-
dental idealism’s resolution to the conflict, in the next section. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See also: R 5608; R 5970; R 5973 in NF. Additionally, Forman (2013) cites the following 
notes as places where Kant distinguishes freedom from chance, which are not found in NF: 
R 3906; R 4091; R 4161; R 4929. 	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4. Transcendental Idealism, Noumenal Agency, 
and the Threat of Chance 
 
ant’s Critical account of freedom is constituted by a 
novel attempt to reconcile a libertarian metaphysics of 
agency with a thoroughgoing PSR in the natural 
world.15 By the time of the publication of the Critique of Pure 
Reason (1781), Kant is committed to securing libertarian 
freedom for human beings, and he thinks that this is possible 
only through the doctrine of transcendental idealism and its 
distinction between appearances and things in themselves. At 
this point, however, Kant’s aim is only to show that strict 
determinism in the natural world does not preclude the 
possibility that our actions are also the result of freedom. Noth-
ing prevents us from attributing to human beings an atemporal 
existence, from which we can act independently of antecedent 
determination. Kant calls this capacity ‘transcendental free-
dom,’ and he defines it as “the faculty of beginning a state from 
itself, the causality of which does not in turn stand under 
another cause determining it in time [...]” (A533/B561). While 
there is nothing conceptually incoherent about this notion, 
Kant’s argument here does not amount to a proof of the reality 
of freedom. This being the case, chance has not yet been ruled 
out with respect to the determinations of this kind of causality. 
The conflict between freedom and determinism appears in 
the Third Antinomy of the Transcendental Dialectic (A444/ 
B472—A451/B 579). As it is presented, the problem is a cos-
mological one. The understanding, in order to preserve the unity 
of experience, demands that every event in the world be ex-
plained according to the law of cause and effect and under the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Kant’s Critical account of freedom is notoriously difficult, and it is nearly impossible to 
discuss it without inviting numerous interpretive challenges. My aim here, though, is not to 
wade into the various debates surrounding transcendental idealism. In particular, I do not take 
on the question of whether Kant’s distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal 
world is to be understood as a metaphysical doctrine rather than an epistemic or 
methodological distinction between two ‘aspects’ or ‘standpoints.’ 
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conditions of space and time.16 At the same time, Reason 
demands a sufficient explanation of the objects of appearance, 
which it can never find in the regress of temporal causes. Since 
any cause in nature is itself an effect, we can never arrive at a 
temporally first cause. A lack of completeness in the explan-
ation of the series of causes makes it seem necessary also to 
affirm a spontaneous first cause. 
The resolution of this antinomy relies on central tenets of 
transcendental idealism. Two claims of transcendental idealism 
are relevant for our purposes. First, there is a distinction 
between objects as they appear to the senses (phenomena) and 
things in themselves (noumena). Second, space and time are 
merely ideal forms of our intuition of sensible objects, and not 
properties of things in themselves. What this allows Kant to do 
is affirm a strict PSR in the phenomenal world while main-
taining freedom for human beings insofar as they also have an 
atemporal existence in the noumenal world. As temporal 
events, our actions follow necessarily from their prior events 
and in accordance with the laws of nature. However, we can 
also think of ourselves as agents who possess transcendental 
freedom, capable of initiating action apart from antecedently 
determining grounds. 
At issue is whether asserting both causalities is contradictory, 
requiring us to reject freedom: “Thus the only question is 
whether, despite this, in regard to the very same effect that is 
determined by nature, freedom might also take place, or is this 
entirely excluded through that inviolable rule?” (A536/B564). 
In resolving the conflict between freedom and determinism in 
the Third Antinomy, all that Kant aims to show is that there is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Kant provides a demonstration of the PSR in the Second Analogy of Experience: “If, 
therefore, we experience that something happens, then we always presuppose that something 
else precedes it, which it follows in accordance with a rule” (A195/B240). Notably, Kant 
now restricts the application of this principle to objects of possible experience. For an 
excellent and thorough treatment of the changes that the PSR undergoes into the Critical 
period, see chapter 5 of Longuenesse’s Kant on the Human Standpoint (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2009), 117-142. Initially published as: “Kant’s deconstruction of the 
principle of sufficient reason,” Harvard Review of Philosophy, 9 (2001): 67-87. 
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no contradiction in holding that our actions are both the effect of 
natural necessity and freedom – that “without the least in-
terruption of its connection with natural causes, [empirical 
causality] could nevertheless be an effect of a causality that is 
not empirical, but rather intelligible [...]” (A544/B572). Kant’s 
argument here is that freedom is not ruled out by a PSR that 
holds at the level of phenomena. In this sense, Kant’s aim in the 
theoretical philosophy is rather modest with respect to a poten-
tial proof of freedom. He professes not to have proven that 
freedom is real, much less that it is really possible:17 
 
Do freedom and natural necessity in one and the same 
action contradict each other? [...] It should be noted that 
here we have not been trying to establish the reality of 
freedom. [...] [To show] that [...] nature at least does not 
conflict with causality through freedom – that was the one 
single thing we could accomplish, and it alone was our 
sole concern (A557/ B585-A558/B586). 
 
Only transcendental idealism makes it possible to hold that our 
actions in the phenomenal world can be the effect of both 
natural necessity and freedom, insofar as we can think of our 
actions in the phenomenal world as grounded in the activity of 
our noumenal will. 
It follows from all of this that Kant has not yet dealt with a 
worry about chance regarding our noumenal agency. The pre-
critical Kant rejects a conception of freedom as a lack of 
determining grounds on the basis that it allows chance. It is 
natural to wonder how his Critical restriction of the PSR to the 
appearances does not open him up to the very objection he 
raises against Crusius in the New Elucidation.18 Kant’s theory 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Here, by ‘possibility,’ Kant means something that can be met with in intuition, as opposed 
to logical possibility. While no proof of the reality of freedom is possible, neither can it be 
shown that there is no freedom; that is, its logical impossibility cannot be demonstrated either.	  
18 Allison, 137; Pereboom, 541. 
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of freedom would hardly be an improvement on the Crusian 
view were it unable to account for the operation of our will 
without simply pushing back the worry of chance to the 
noumenal level. Of course, Kant is quite clear that we can have 
no insight into why we chose as we did. Even then, we should 
want from an account of freedom a story as to why it is not the 
result of chance: that it was made freely.19 
Before going further, I want to address one line of thinking 
that might be tempting to follow at this point. One could point 
to Kant’s Critical restrictions on theoretical knowledge of things 
in themselves and say that Kant takes the Chance objection to 
be unanswerable in the context of the Critical philosophy, but 
also that it does not need to be answered for the very same 
reason. On this reading, the Critical solution would amount to a 
dismissal of the objection through a more particular application 
or extension of the doctrine of the incomprehensibility of free 
agency. Indeed, there are some compelling reasons to think that 
this must be what Kant is committed to saying. To be sure, the 
incomprehensibility of freedom is a central part of Kant’s 
Critical view. For example, in one note, Kant defines freedom 
as: “the capacity to produce and effect something [original],” 
and goes on to say: “But how [original causality and an original 
capacity for efficient causation] obtain in a [derivative entity] is 
not to be comprehended at all” (R 4221; NF 17:463). It might 
be argued that our inability to comprehend freedom extends to 
an inability to comprehend why a free will chooses to act one 
way rather than another.20 Insofar as Kant is committed to the 
distinction between appearances and things in themselves, it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Ameriks observes that “to give a proof of our absolute spontaneity is not necessarily to 
give an explanation of how it operates” (195). 
20 Michalson thinks that this is a serious problem for Kant: “The inability truly to know my 
own disposition (because it is noumenal) would seem to saddle me with a moral obligation 
which I am only partially equipped to meet. The Kantian insight that I ‘ground’ my own act 
of giving myself a dispositional ground begins to look like the frightening possibility that the 
choice of a disposition is a hit-or-miss matter of sheer luck or blind chance” (68; emphasis 
mine). 	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seems that we cannot have knowledge of our free actions, since 
they exist in the atemporal world of things in themselves. 
I think that this is true in the context of the theoretical 
philosophy. At the end of the first Critique, the idea of a 
spontaneous causality that stands outside of time is a mere 
logical possibility, the objective reality of which has yet to be 
shown. And while this secures the possibility of freedom, it 
does not rule out the possibility of chance either. So, it would be 
problematic if the story ended here. In later writings, Kant goes 
on to argue unequivocally for the reality of freedom from the 
practical point of view. At the end of the Analytic of the 2nd 
Critique, Kant writes: 
 
Therefore, that unconditioned causality and the capacity 
for it, freedom, and with it a being (I myself) that belongs 
to the sensible world but at the same time to the 
intelligible world, is not merely thought indeterminately 
and problematically (speculative reason could already find 
this feasible) but is even determined with respect to the 
law of its causality and cognized assertorically; and thus 
the reality of the intelligible world is given to us, and 
indeed as determined from a practical perspective, and this 
determination, which for theoretical purposes would be 
transcendent (extravagant), is for practical purposes 
immanent (KpV 5:105). 
 
It is difficult to downplay the strength of Kant’s language in 
this passage. Kant maintains that freedom can only be secured 
on the basis of practical reason. This ‘practical proof’ of free-
dom is the subject of the next section, and it is where we begin 
to find the materials for a refutation of chance for noumenal 
willing. 
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5. Autonomy and Choice: 
A Will under Practical Laws 
 
t the beginning of Groundwork III, Kant claims that a 
“lawless” will is an “absurdity” (G 4:446). The notion 
of a causality brings with it the notion of being law- 
governed, and so there could not be a will that operates 
according to no law whatsoever. To be sure, freedom requires 
independence from determination by the laws of nature; but this 
is a merely negative definition of freedom. The positive 
definition of freedom, then, is that of a will that chooses for 
itself the principle on which it will act, rather than having a 
principle imposed on it from without. This feature of a free will 
is none other than its autonomy: “the will’s property of being a 
law to itself” (G 4:447). Moreover, in the 2nd
 
Critique, Kant 
famously argues for the reality of freedom on the basis of our 
consciousness of the moral law as the law of a free will. What’s 
more, in all of this, Kant wants to account for a genuine power 
of free choice with respect to our duty, and, at the same time, 
maintain that ‘blind chance’ is not involved in the exercise of 
this choice. To this end, Kant distinguishes between two aspects 
of the autonomous will: its law-giving side (Wille) and its 
executive side (Willkür), and attributes to the latter a capacity to 
choose whether to make the moral law its principle for action. 
The notion of Wille is the idea of a pure will, concerned with 
objective laws that are valid for all rational beings. Pure reason 
recognizes the moral law as the only principle fit to govern a 
free will. By contrast, Willkür is the power of choice, which can 
decide whether to act on the law given by Wille. Willkür can 
either conform to the moral law, as given by Wille, or deviate 
from it. As such, Willkür is concerned with the subjective aspect 
of the will, namely, its maxims. Kant defines a ‘maxim’ as an 
agent’s “subjective principle of action” (MM 6:225). We can 
think of a maxim as expressing what an agent values, or takes to 
be good or bad. In the Metaphysics of Morals (1797), Kant 
A 
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presents the contrast as follows: “Laws proceed from the will 
[Wille], maxims from choice [Willkür]” (MM 6:226). Kant 
speaks of Wille as binding on Willkür in the sense that it is 
sufficient to determine Willkür in its adoption of a maxim. 
However, because the human will is influenced by sensibility 
and not necessitated by it, no incentive – be it moral or sensuous 
– is determining on its own. Instead, the agent must always 
choose whether to make a given incentive the guiding principle 
of his actions. In a famous passage from the Religion within the 
boundaries of mere reason (1793), Kant puts forward what 
Allison has deemed the Incorporation Thesis:21 
 
[F]reedom of the power of choice [Willkür] has the 
characteristic, entirely peculiar to it, that it cannot be 
determined to action through any incentive except so far 
as the human being has incorporated it into his maxim 
(has made it into a universal rule for himself, according to 
which he wills to conduct himself); only in this way can 
an incentive, whatever it may be, coexist with the absolute 
spontaneity of the power of choice (of freedom) (Rel 6:23-
24). 
 
Whereas Kant’s early view denies that freedom involves the 
presence of alternative possibilities, he now seems to build into 
his mature account a certain degree of indifference. Willkür has 
the ability to choose either to obey the moral law or not: the 
“power to do or to refrain from doing as one pleases” (MM 
6:213). I can make the objective law my subjective principle of 
action, and thus realize my autonomy. Or, I can act out of self-
love, upon which there “results heteronomy of choice 
[Willkur]” (KpV 5:33). As such, it is central to Kant’s account 
of the will that it possess this spontaneous power of choice. 
Yet there appears to be a tension between claiming that the 
will’s autonomy consists in its being determined by the moral 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 cf. Allison (1990: 5-6, 40, 47-8, 151, 189-90). 
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law and also that a free will can choose to deviate from the 
moral law in its actions. In what sense is the moral law the law 
of a free will? Kant needs to explain how free agents are able to 
exercise this power of choice – which includes the possibility of 
acting against the moral law (i.e., performing evil actions) – 
without this ultimately being attributed to ‘blind chance.’ Kant 
wants to distance himself from Leibniz and Wolff’s intellect-
ualism, according to which the strongest motive always wins 
out; Willkür must be free from determination by any antecedent 
motive. So, does Kant simply adopt Crusius’s view about the 
determination of the will wholesale? Indeed, the notion of 
Willkür itself seems to imply the same kind of indifference. 
Kant is intent on attributing to the will a capacity to operate 
apart from the strict determination of reason. At the same time, 
it should maintain a connection to it such that it is not a ‘blind’ 
power. Moreover, it is incumbent upon him to do this in a way 
that also renders intelligible our capacity to deviate from the 
commands of morality. Unlike natural events, whose laws 
concern what does happen, the laws of freedom concern what 
ought to happen.22 It is for this reason that Kant calls them 
‘imperatives,’ or ‘practical’ laws. However, given that the 
moral law only determines ‘practically,’ there seems to be no 
explanation for why I choose as I do, especially when I choose 
to prioritize sensible motives over the moral law. Several 
commentators have noted that Kant faces a serious challenge in 
explaining why it is that a purely rational will would choose 
anything other than the good.23 Since experience reveals to us 
that human beings are capable of performing evil actions, it is 
unclear how Kant can handle the issue of chance in his account 
of the will’s power of choice – specifically, when it acts 
contrary to the moral law. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Cf. A547/B575-A550/B578; G 4:387-88; KpV 5:19  
23 See: Christine Korsgaard, “Morality as Freedom,” in Creating the Kingdom of Ends 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 159-160; Christopher Insole, Kant and the 
Creation of Freedom: A Theological Problem (Oxford UP: Oxford, 2013), 127-134. 
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In sum, Kant casts the relationship between Wille and 
Willkür in such a way that seems to commit him to contra-
dictory claims: (1) Wille is the ground of Willkür in the adoption 
of its maxims, while (2) Willkür is able to form maxims that 
subordinate Wille to sensibility. To make matters worse, Kant 
needs to uphold both claims. Denying the first would entail that 
we are not autonomous. Denying the second makes it such that 
our evil actions are not the product of free choice, which would 
preclude imputability for our immoral actions. In the next and 
final section, I show how Kant’s distinction between a ‘wicked’ 
and ‘diabolical’ will – in particular, his argument for the im-
possibility of the latter – makes sense of (1) such that the ten-
sion between (1) and (2) is resolved. This, I argue, constitutes 
his practical refutation of chance. 
 
6. Chance, Revisited: Against a Lawless Will 
 
ant is committed to the impossibility of chance at the 
level of our noumenal will, as suggested by his re-
marks at the beginning of Groundwork III to the effect 
that a “lawless” will would be an “absurdity” (G 4:446). Yet 
Kant does not argue for this claim there.24 Instead, it is only in 
the Religion that we find some semblance of an argument 
against the possibility of a will without a law. Even then, Kant’s 
account remains puzzling, in large part due to the swiftness of 
his discussion. The context here is a discussion of whether there 
could be such a thing as a “diabolical” will – one that chooses 
evil for its own sake, acting apart from the moral law as an 
incentive altogether (Rel 6:35). Kant claims that this kind of will 
is impossible, and I am going to argue that this constitutes his 
practical refutation of chance – an argument against the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Morgan (2005: 73) suggests that Kant simply takes for granted the proof of the Second 
Analogy in the first Critique with respect to the claim that lawfulness is an essential feature of 
causality. Perhaps Kant is unwarranted in assuming of noumenal causalities a kind of 
lawfulness akin to that in the phenomenal world. 
K 
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possibility of a ‘lawless’ causality, which would operate apart 
from any rule or principle whatsoever. However, to say that the 
will is law-governed is not to say that it is determinable in the 
same way as the causality of nature. What will emerge, then, in 
an effort to elucidate Kant’s claim that a free will is lawful, is a 
conception of the distinct kind of grounding relationship that 
practical laws have to the human will, such that this lawfulness 
applies even when a free will chooses to deviate from its law. 
The clearest account of the way the moral law functions as a 
determining ground is in Book I of the Religion, where Kant 
distinguishes between a ‘wicked’ and a ‘diabolical’ will. Here, 
Kant defines an evil will as one that chooses to prioritize self-
love to duty. It is important to note that this is a formal 
definition of evil; Kant conceives of an evil will in terms of the 
ordering of the incentives in one’s maxim. What makes it evil is 
that it places respect for duty below self-love, rather than 
making the moral law its supreme guiding principle. As such, 
even when we act contrary to the moral law, we never disobey 
it in such a way that our willing can be considered “diabolical,” 
choosing evil for its own sake (Rel 6:35). This would be a will 
entirely free of law, which, Kant says, is a contradiction: 
 
To think of oneself as a freely acting being, yet as exemp-
ted from the one law commensurate to such a being (the 
moral law), would amount to the thought of a cause 
operating without any law at all (for the determination 
according to natural law is abolished on account of 
freedom): and this is a contradiction (Rel 6:35; emphasis 
mine). 
 
In short, we can never remove the moral law as an incentive; it 
remains a law that we can never escape. Kant continues: “The 
human being (even the worst) does not repudiate the moral law, 
whatever his maxims, in rebellious attitude (by revoking 
obedience to it). The law rather imposes itself on him irresist-
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ibly, because of his moral predisposition [...]” (Rel 6:36). So, 
what is going on when we choose evil is not that we are 
choosing it qua evil. We are aware of the moral law as being 
binding on us, and so our actions can never be performed apart 
from its being valid for us.25 Rather, Willkür makes a choice to 
prefer its own happiness to its duty, which is to say that the 
most it is capable of is placing the incentive of morality below 
all others. 
It may seem strange to appeal to the determining grounds of 
the will as a way of responding to the problem of chance, given 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 An anonymous reviewer suggests that the crucial difference between a ‘wicked’ and 
‘diabolical’ will is not a matter of whether the moral law is valid for such a will, but rather the 
nature of the incentive to disobey the moral law. That is, rather than seeing the wicked will as 
bound by the moral law but subordinating it to duty, and the diabolical will as not bound by 
the moral law at all (and so, as I am arguing, ‘lawless’), one might interpret Kant’s distinction 
here as one between the kinds of motivation to do evil: either, to prioritize the incentive of 
one’s own happiness to the incentive of morality, or to take disobedience to the law as a 
positive incentive. The latter is certainly true of the diabolical will, insofar as Kant conceives 
of it as choosing evil for its own sake. That said, Kant describes such an act as involving 
‘exoneration’ and ‘repudiation,’ and I take this to be the crucial element - namely, that the 
diabolical will would be one that is (to use Kant’s words) “exempt” from the law altogether. I 
take Wood (2010) to agree with me on this point, when he writes: “Kant’s view here, 
especially his rejection of the possibility of a ‘diabolical will,’ is sometimes criticized for not 
allowing for the possibility – as it is put – that people can do ‘evil for evil’s sake.’ The 
objectors think that Kant is denying we can choose an action not because it promotes our 
self-interest or satisfies some contingent desire, but simply because it is wrong. But I think 
they have misunderstood him. Kant’s argument is that it would be incoherent to suppose a 
being could be responsible for obeying the moral law and yet lack any rational incentive to 
obey the law, possessing originally only a rational incentive to disobey it [...] These 
impossibilities are what Kant rejects under the heading of a ‘diabolical will’ – not because it 
represents something ‘too evil’ for human nature, but because it would be incoherent to 
condemn as evil the choices of a being that could recognize no decisive reason to choose in 
favor of morality. Whatever harm to human or other beings might be caused by the actions 
of such a being, they could not be considered evil” (153-54). Wood highlights that the 
distinctive mark of a diabolical will is not that it chooses evil for its own sake (though this is 
certainly part of the notion of it), but rather that it would only possess one incentive. It might 
be helpful to think of this as a counterpart to the holy will, as a will that is guided solely by the 
unconditional principle of immorality. This being the case, we cannot coherently say that 
something could be an agent which is both not under the moral law and yet responsible for its 
actions. As Allison (1996) writes: “Kant’s denial of a diabolical will is not a dubious piece of 
empirical moral psychology, but rather an a priori claim about the conditions of the 
possibility of moral accountability” (176). 	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the above passages where Kant maintains that free acts lack 
determining grounds. In other words, seeing as the worry about 
chance in Kant’s Critical account of freedom is motivated by 
his shift to a libertarian position that denies the existence of 
determining grounds for free acts, the reader may find it 
puzzling that Kant’s response to the objection that this kind of 
account of freedom amounts to chance could involve an 
argument for there, in fact, being grounds of the will. The first 
thing to note, towards dissolving this apparent tension, is that 
Kant’s claim that free acts lack determining grounds is made 
from the theoretical point of view, whereas the claim that the 
will possesses grounds comes from within the practical 
philosophy. But more needs to be said about why it is that 
holding these claims from two different points of view allows 
them to be held without contradiction.26 In particular, what is a 
‘determining ground’ in the practical setting? Unfortunately, 
Kant does not explicitly address his use of this term in the 
practical philosophy. More specifically, since Kant never 
suggests that he is using the term differently than he did in the 
pre-critical period, one might ask why we should think that the 
term ‘determining ground’ comes to be used in a way that 
means anything other than a ground that determines an effect to 
the exclusion of its opposite. That is, one might wonder why we 
should think that there exist these different kinds of grounds in 
the case of the will. 
Recall the way that Kant’s resolution of the Third Antinomy 
involves showing that we can at least think of there being both a 
causality from nature and a causality from freedom. In the 
Canon of the first Critique, Kant defines ‘practical laws’ as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 In speaking of ‘standpoints’ and ‘points of view,’ I do not mean to commit myself to a 
particular interpretation of transcendental idealism. Despite the similarity in language to a 
‘one object, two aspect’ view, I am merely referring to Kant’s distinction between the 
‘theoretical’ and ‘practical’ use of the faculty of reason. And, as I see it, nothing I say here 
precludes a particular reading of transcendental idealism, though this is not to say that certain 
readings might not have a more difficult time than others in reconciling aspects of my 
account with their own views.	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“imperatives, i.e., objective laws of freedom, and that say what 
ought to happen, even though perhaps it never does happen, 
and that are thereby distinguished from laws of nature, which 
deal only with that which does happen, on which account the 
former are also called practical laws” (A802/B830). Central to 
Kant’s project, then, is an explanation of how there can be more 
than one kind of lawfulness, as well as in what sense practical 
laws can be grounds. 
So, as an unconditioned causality, the will lacks determining 
grounds. And yet, as a causality, its operation is lawful and not 
random. Its connection to laws cannot be the same as that 
between natural events and the laws of nature, for this would be 
to say that: in all circumstances in which a representation of the 
moral law were present, its effect (i.e., morally good action) 
would follow to the exclusion of any other.27 And we know that 
this is not the case. Kant describes the relationship between a 
will and the moral law as follows: the will has “grounds of 
reason” for its actions, and yet these are “grounds to which this 
will is not by its nature necessarily obedient” (G 4:413). So, 
whatever Kant’s argument is for the claim that the moral law 
grounds free acts, it must be able also to explain action contrary 
to this law. 
For an imperative to be a ‘ground’ is for my action to be 
initiated under a representation of the moral law: “Now this 
‘ought’ expresses a possible action, the ground of which is 
nothing other than a mere concept, whereas the ground of a 
merely natural action must always be an appearance” (A547/ 
B575). In making room for freedom, then, transcendental 
idealism also made room for a distinction between different 
kinds of determining grounds. ‘Material’ determining grounds 
are always appearances, natural events that are causally 
conditioned. But there are also ‘formal’ determining grounds 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  This is true for God, who is perfectly free. Moreover, this helps to explain the difference 
between a virtuous will and a holy will, the latter being fully determined in a contrary-
excluding way.	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are representations of the “universal lawgiving form” of a 
maxim (KpV 5:28-29).28 This distinction here is between types 
of necessity: “The ought expresses a species of necessity and a 
connection with grounds which does not occur anywhere else in 
the whole of nature” (A547/B575). Practical laws, says Kant, 
are ‘objectively’ necessary, which is to say that they hold for all 
rational beings. By contrast, laws of nature necessitate ‘subject-
ively,’ as is the case withanimal choice, where sensible stimuli 
determine every action. 
What’s more, Kant comes to hold that only transcendental 
idealism has the resources to justify the distinction between 
‘natural’ and ‘practical’ laws, and, hence, a distinction between 
freedom and chance. In short, Kant thinks that free acts 
maintain a connection to grounds that – once we can prove its 
reality – can secure it against a worry about chance. What Kant 
hopes to show is that Crusius’s account is impoverished when it 
comes to accounting for the possibility of practical laws. If there 
are to be grounds that are not fully determining, they cannot 
exist within the transcendental realist framework.29 Instead, 
they must exist in the noumenal world, where they are not 
subject to the conditions of space and time. This not only makes 
possible practical laws, but also explains why action governed 
by them is not susceptible to a worry about chance. Chance 
occurrences lack a connection to any kind of grounds what-
soever, whereas free acts are governed by practical laws. That 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  This is true for God, who is perfectly free. Moreover, this helps to explain the difference 
between a virtuous will and a holy will, the latter being fully determined in a contrary-
excluding way.	  29	  Kant makes this point in the Analytic of the 2nd Critique: “If, then, one wants to attribute 
freedom to a being whose existence is determined in time, one cannot, so far at least, exempt 
this being from the law of natural necessity as to all events in its existence and consequently 
as to its actions as well; for, that would be tantamount to handing it over to blind chance. But 
since this law unavoidably concerns all causality of things so far as their existence in time is 
determinable, if this were the way in which one had to represent also the existence of these 
things in themselves then freedom would have to be rejected as a null and impossible 
concept” (KpV 5:95; boldfaced mine). This is one of the only passages in the practical 
philosophy where Kant explicitly discusses ‘blind chance,’ and in it he explains how he sees 
transcendental idealism securing freedom and ruling out chance. 
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Kant takes the notion of a causality operating without a law to 
be a contradiction in terms is something he is committed to in 
both the practical and theoretical realms. If it has no law, it is 
not a will, nor is it a causality.30 
The dialectic, then, has taken the following shape: Kant starts 
off holding a Leibnizian view of freedom in 1755, but moves 
towards a Crusian conception of the will by the mid-1760s, 
construed as a capacity to initiate action apart from being 
determined by grounds. However, Kant does not adopt the 
Crusian position wholesale precisely because he comes to hold 
that only transcendental idealism has the resources to account 
for the possibility of grounds that determine in a non-contrary-
excluding way while still providing a connection to their 
consequences in such a way that evades a worry about chance 
in human action. Moreover, to totally vindicate Kant’s argu-
ment for the possibility of freedom in the first Critique, it was 
necessary to follow his remarks about the autonomous will into 
his discussion of radical evil in the Religion, where the 
distinction between a ‘wicked’ and ‘diabolical’ will illuminates 
the way in which practically necessary laws ground all human 
actions.31 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  In a theoretical context, a chance occurrence is one that happens, so to speak, for no 
reason. Likewise, a diabolical agent would be one who acts for no reason. Korsgaard (2009: 
72-76) argues against the possibility of what she calls ‘particularistic’ willing, which is in 
similar respects a will which would act without universality in its willing. Even a will that 
makes it its maxim to only act on inclinations would still meet the minimal amount of 
universality required to qualify as an agent. See also: Tognazzini (2014), who discusses the 
way in which a chance objection is a worry about our actions being ungrounded in this kind 
of way.	  31	  I am grateful to Emily Carson, Rosalind Chaplin, George di Giovanni, Dai Heide, 
Stephen Palmquist, Lisa Shapiro, Evan Tiffany, and Owen Ware for helpful conversations 
on various drafts of this paper. This paper was presented at a joint conference of the UK Kant 
Society (UKKS) and North American Kant Society (NAKS) at Keele University; I thank 
participants for their feedback. Finally, I thank two anonymous reviewers from this journal 
for very beneficial comments and criticism. 	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